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REMARKS OF NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD*
First, Mel Weiss suggested that Rule 11 destroys the necessary cooper-
ative atmosphere between counsel. 138 I think the question to be asked is
the chicken and the egg question. Is the atmosphere destroyed before the
motion is made or by the motion? I think that the reason that these
motions are made more frequently in metropolitan areas'39 is simply be-
cause metropolitan areas are much more impersonal. I don't think it is
the same in a small town. Further, I think this observation applies to all
discovery sanction motions as well as other similar motions. Mel also
suggested that the floodgates were going to open with respect to Rule
11. 4 There may well be more Rule 11 decisions, though I don't think
the floodgates are going to open. First, I think that except for the
wrongly decided decision in which Mel was involved, 4' by and large
Rule 11 decisions have been reserved for truly outrageous cases.' 42 It
should never be forgotten that judges practiced in a sense in the old
school, 4 3 and I think they have to be truly offended by what happens
before they are going to go through the extra effort to add a Rule 11
decision onto the other decisions that they are already writing.
If you will bear with me, may I share with you a Supreme Court deci-
sion and the comments of some justices which accompanied a recent de-
nial of certiorari.'" The Supreme Court has a rule that reads, "[w]hen
an appeal or petition for writ of certiorari is frivolous, the Court may
award the appellee or the respondent the appropriate damages."' 145 In
denying this petition, three justices, the Chief Justice, Justice Rehnquist
and Justice O'Connor, wanted to apply Rule 49.2 and four Justices, Jus-
tices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, opposed application of
the Rule. Both sides wrote and let me just, if I can, read to you a couple
of sentences from the opinions for two purposes. First, to suggest that it
* Magistrate, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
138. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text (Remarks of Melvyn I. Weiss).
139. A recent statistical study of Rule 11 cases found that the majority of district court
Rule 11 decisions were from major metropolitan areas. See Vairo, supra note 1, at 74.
140. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (Remarks of Melvyn I. Weiss).
141. See Goldman v. Belden, 580 F. Supp. 1373 (W.D.N.Y. 1984), vacated, 754 F.2d
1059 (2d Cir. 1985).
142. See, e.g., Felix v. Arizona Dep't of Health Servs., Goods, Vital Records Section,
606 F. Supp. 634, 636 (D. Ariz. 1985) (plaintiffs' admiralty action to recover their origi-
nal birth certificates held by the State of Arizona held to not "even arguably have a
significant relationship to traditional maritime activity" and thus "so entirely frivolous
and patently groundless" as to warrant Rule 11 sanctions); McLaughlin v. Bradlee, 602
F. Supp. 1412, 1417 (D.D.C. 1985) (because plaintiff "attempt[ed] to relitigate matters
already adjudicated" imposition of Rule 11 sanctions was proper); Heimbaugh v. City
and County of San Francisco, 591 F. Supp. 1573, 1577 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (plaintiffs claim
that city police officers violated his first amendment rights and right to equal protection
when they threw him off a hardball field because he was playing softball was "frivolous
on its face" and therefore Rule 11 sanctions were justified).
143. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 in its original form was adopted in 1937 and amended in 1983.
144. See Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 105 S. Ct. 1824 (1985).
145. Sup. Ct. R. 49.2.
RULE 11 SYMPOSIUM
is interesting to observe how the Supreme Court is handling this issue
after they promulgated Rule 11, and also to perhaps suggest that it does
not indicate that the floodgates are open. Those judges favoring the use
of the rule stated:
Judicious use of the sanction of Rule 49.2 in egregious cases--and this
is an egregious case-should discourage many of the patently meritless
applications that are filed here each year. In the long run, this is the
more effective way to "minimize the time devoted to the disposition of
applications that are plainly without merit,"... after all, this is the
whole purpose of Rule 49.2. Further, while freedom of access to the
courts is indeed a cherished value, every misuse of any court's time
impinges on the right of other litigants with valid or at least arguable
claims to gain access to the judicial process. The time this Court ex-
pends examining and processing frivolous applications is very substan-
tial, and it is time that could be devoted to considering claims which
merit consideration. 146
The opponents stated as follows:
Any evenhanded attempt to determine which of the unmeritorious ap-
plications should give rise to sanctions. . . would be a time-consum-
ing and unrewarding task. It would require us either to adopt a
procedure for assessing a fair compensatory damage award in particu-
lar cases, or to impose a somewhat arbitrary penalty whenever such a
motion is granted. Unless there has been a gross abuse of the judicial
process, or demonstrable and significant harm to a litigant, such action
is unwarranted... . Creating a risk that the invocation of the judicial
process may give rise to punitive sanctions simply because the litigant's
claim is unmeritorious could only deter the legitimate exercise of the
right to seek a peaceful redress of grievances through judicial means.
This Court, above all, should uphold the principle of open access.147
This latter opinion is apropos of Judge Sifton's story. 14 So I make the
observation that the debate is not only going on in this room, it is still
going on in the Supreme Court even though Rule 11 has been adopted.
And the final thing I would like to say is I think that much of what is
happening with respect to Rule 11 is not known to any of the judges on
this panel, because it is really happening in law offices. I am sure that
there are many conversations between lawyer and client where a lawyer
is explaining to a client that he simply cannot do what the client wishes
him to do-that it would expose the lawyer to sanctions. I suspect that
in those conversations the lawyer is quite grateful for the existence of the
Rule. I also suspect that there are many situations where the plaintiffs
voluntarily discontinue actions upon being confronted by a defendant
with the facts and probably the threat of a Rule 11 motion. I suspect
that there are also numerous motions that are never made.
146. Talamini, 105 S. Ct. at 1825.
147. Id. at 1827-28 (footnote omitted).
148. See supra text following note 137 (Remarks of Charles Sifton).
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